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OWNERSHIP OF SPACE
By Thompson George Marsh*
T would be giving away the whole story to state at the outset that this discussion is to be about nothing, or nothingness, and so the more scientific term, "space" has been
adopted. The mere fact that space may not have any value
does not negative the possibility of ownership thereof, because
the law is well settled that there may be ownership of almost
any sort of a new idea, and ownership of shares in almost any
sort of a corporation, new or old.
Almost any tangible object can be owned if it can be possessed or occupied, and the same is true of three dimensional
space defined by reference to the earth.
Ordinarily land is not considered as having three dimensions, but it must necessarily be so, and if the old maxim,
"cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et at inferos", be
true, the normal shape of land must be that of an inverted
pyramid, with its apex at the center of the earth, its sides determined by planes passing through the surface boundaries,
and its base "ad coelum". By a doctrine of accession any
tangible objects which are affixed within this space are considered to. be a part of the land. But when tangible things
are detached or removed from the space they are no longer
land but chattels, as rock that has been quarried, and they remain chattels until again affixed within some space, as rock
in a foundation.
This at least establishes that the objects themselves are
not land, and the other side of the proposition, namely, that
mere space is land, is just as true.
It is said that the largest building in the world is the
Merchandise Mart in Chicago; not the tallest, but the largest in cubic feet. The building is not owned by the owner of
*Professor of Law, University of Denver.
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the soil beneath it, nor was the right to possession acquired by
a lease. The soil was owned in fee simple by the Chicago
and Northwestern Railway Company and that part of the
space to be occupied by the building was conveyed in fee simple to the owners of the building. The rest of the land, including the surface and some space above it, was reserved by
the Railroad. The building is supported by piers and I am
not informed as to the ownership of the land upon which
those piers rest.
This is certainly an extreme illustration of the proposition that mere space is land and as much may be owned,
whether it be above or below the surface of the ground. And
it is believed that the incidents of ownership of space or land
are very much the same whether the land be above or below
the surface of the, ground.
Chief among the incidents of ownership of ordinary land
space are four claims: that the support of the soil, in its natural state, be not removed by another so as to cause substantial damage; that the land be not occupied or possessed by
another; that a reasonable use of the land be not interfered
with unreasonably by another; and that the close be not broken by another.
As to the validity of these claims as incidents of the ownership of space above the surface, the maxim quoted above is
not a sufficient basis upon which to base any conclusions.
At a meeting of the Air Law Institute in the summer of
1930, Dr. Arnold D. McNair, Lecturer in Law at the University of Cambridge, referred to the ancient maxim, not as
a maxim, but as a "slogan", and that seems a proper evaluation. It is found in the Year Books, but it would not have
gained much of a place in the common law, had it not been
used by Coke in his Commentary upon Littleton. The context in which it is there found may perhaps account for its
remarkable virility. In his discussion of fees simple the author says of land, "aald therefore this element of the earth is
preferred before the other elements; first and principally,
because it is for the habitation and resting place of man; for
man can not rest in any of the other elements, neither in the
water, ayre, or fire. For as the heavens are the habitation of
Almightie God, so the earth hath he appointed as the suburbs
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of heaven to be the habitation of man; * * Besides, everything, as it serveth more immediately * * for the food and
use of man* * * * hath the precedent dignity before any other.
And this doth the earth; for out of the earth commeth man's
food, and bread that strengthens man's heart, and the wine
that gladdeth the heart of man, and oyle that makes him a
cheerful countenance * * * Also the waters that yeeld fish for
the food and sustenance of man are not by that name demandable in a praecipe; but the land whereupon the water floweth
or standeth is demandable: and besides, the earth doth furnish man with many other necessaries for his use, as it is replenished with hidden treasures; namely, with gold, silver,
brasse, iron, tynne, lead, and other metals, and also with a great
varietie of precious stones, and many other things for profit,
ornament and pleasure. And lastly, the earth hath in law a
great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been said,
but of ayre and all other things even up to heaven; for cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum".
In spite of its antiquity, that is not a very impressive statement of a rule of law, though it did set the slogan off to a
good start and it has been quoted ever since.
Getting back to a consideration of the claims incident to
ownership of land and a consideration of their meaning when
the land is space above the surface, we can at once recognize
the irrelevance of a claim that the support of the land in its
natural state be not removed by another, and pass to a consideration of the second claim, that the space be not occupied
or possessed by another. In positive terms this means that
the owner of the ground has the exclusive rightful power to
occupy the space above the ground. Of this there is no doubt,
for there are many cases ordering or justifying the removal of
overhanging eaves and signs and lights and branches. In
Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N. Y. 486; an action
of ejectment was maintained against a defendant who had
stretched a wire high above the surface of the plaintiff's land,
and in the case of the Merchandise Mart already mentioned,
since the grantees have acquired by conveyance the exclusive
rightful power to occupy the space above the surface, that
power must have been an incident of the ownership of the
land even before the space above the surface was actually oc-

DICTA

cupied. In this respect there seems to be no difference between the claims of the owner with reference to ground space
and air space.
The third incident of land ownership to be considered
is the claim that a reasonable use of the land be not interfered
with unreasonably by another. These are the cases of nuisances, by noises, odors, destructive fumes, vibrations, smoke,
dust, fear and other means of interference with enjoyment of
land, not involving a technical breaking of the close. In order to be actionable such interference must not only result in
substantial damage to the landowner, but it must be the result
of a negative or positive act of the defendant which under all
the circumstances is unreasonable. This is true whether the
means of interference be transmitted through the air or
through the ground. And since the damage to the landowner
is determined by reference to use, rather than to space, it seems
that in this respect the claim of the landowner is not affected
by the fact that the space involved may be above or below the
surface of the ground.
It is the fourth claim, that the close be not broken by
another, which raises the most interesting questions. It is
undoubtedly the general rule that any violation of this claim
makes the wrongdoer liable in trespass, whether he has acted
in good faith or bad faith, and whether damage has been
caused or not.
But while this is the general rule there are some interesting exceptions, some of the best examples of which are furnished by the decisions from our own state.
In Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, it is said that one who
breaks the close for the purpose of diverting and appropriating water is not liable for so doing.
And in Morris v. Fraker, S Colo. 425, it was held that if
cattle enter upon the land of the plaintiff and destroy crops,
the owner of the cattle is not liable unless the land was protected by a fence sufficient to turn ordinary stock.
In these cases the judges expressly stated that the results
were not based upon any statute, but simply upon what they
called necessity. The necessity lay merely in the fact that if
such invasions of the close were held actionable it was believed
that the development of agriculture and grazing would be
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seriously hampered, and the importance of those industries
was held to justify the departures from the general rule of
the common law, evert though in both cases there was not
merely a technical breaking of the close but resulting damage
of considerable consequence.
What about a breaking of the close above the surface of
the ground? Lord Ellenborough, in 1815, raised this quaere
in Pickering v. Rudd, a case in which it was decided that the
defendant's sign board did not hang over the plaintiff's land.
Such a case as a matter of course involved a discussion of the
maxim about heaven, and in the course of his opinion, Lord
Ellenborough said something about a balloon. As reported
in 4 Campbell 219, he said, "Nay, if this board overhanging
the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an
aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit,
at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon
passes in the course of his voyage."
But as reported in 1 Starkie 45, he simply asked, "would
trespass lie for passing through the air in a balloon over the
land of another?"
In my opinion that question has not yet been answered,
though it was presented for decision in two cases which have
been reported during the past few months. Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 170 N. E. 385; and Swetland v. Curtiss
Airports, 41 Fed. 2nd. 929. In both cases the complainants
owned country estates adjoining airports and in both cases bills
were brought to enjoin flights by planes over the land of the
complainants, or perhaps more accurately, into the land of the
complainants. Both decisions relied to a considerable degree
upon the United States Air Commerce Act of 1926 wherein
penalties are provided for flights under minimum altitudes
of safety. The act empowered the Secretary of Commerce
to determine the minimum altitudes of safety. His regulation, contained in the Air Commerce Regulations of 1928, is
as follows: "exclusive of taking off from or landing on an established landing field, airport, or on property designated for
that purpose by the owner, * * * aircraft shall not be flown
(1) over the conjested parts of cities, towns, or settlements
except at a height sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe
emergency landing, which in no case shall be less than 1,000
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feet. (2) Elsewhere at heights less than 500 feet, except
where indispensible to an industrial flying operation."
In both cases the lands involved were in uncongested
areas, and in both it was held therefore that flights at an
altitude of over 500 feet were not actionable. Presumably
then, the "coelum" begins at 500 feet and according to Lord
Coke's explanation of the maxim, the Secretary of Commerce
has the power, within the limits of a sound discretion to enlarge or even to diminish the area of the "habitation of Almightie God" at will, with the corresponding loss or gain to
all the owners of parts of the "habitation of man" in the
United States.
And the Secretary of Commerce has done just that, by an
amendment to the Federal Air Traffic Rules, effective September 19, 1930, subsequent to the decisions in these cases.
The amendment says that, "The minimum safe altitudes of
flight in taking off and landing and while flying over the property of another in taking off or landing, are those at which such
flights by aircraft may be made without being in dangerous
proximity to persons or property on the land or water beneath,
or unsafe to the aircraft."
To be consistent, it would seem that these courts would
have to give full effect to the amended regulation, and hold
all such flights not actionable. But to give such effect to a
traffic regulation seems to be either silly, or unconstitutional,
as a taking of property without compensation, for while regulation of flight is undoubtedly within the broad scope of the
police power, the taking of land for highways has not heretofore been thought to be.
As to flights under 500 feet, both courts ignored that part
of the same sentence of the Regulation which excepted such
flight when landing or taking off.
It is hard to understand why equal force should not have
been given to both parts of the same sentence of the law, but
it was not, and the courts proceeded to consider the lower
flights on common law principles. In the Smith Case, the
court considered these lower flights in two groups.
As to flights between 100 and 500 feet, the court said,
"The one or two instances of flights at less than 500 feet over
land of the plaintiffs and the possibility of similar flights in
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the future, as set out by the master and already narrated, are
not sufficient to require or warrant injunctive relief. The injury thus done to and the interference with any and all valuable use of the property of the plaintiffs are not certain and
substantial, but rather are slight and theoretical. There has
been no physical contact with property of the plaintiffs in
actual use or practicably usable."
This is certainly not a holding that such flights are trespasses.
As to flights under 100 feet, the court said, "In degree
these flights approach much more closely to an interference
with rightful enjoyment of land than do flights at the minimum altitude permissible for general travel by aircraft. * * *

The facts show an intrusion upon the land of the plaintiffs
by flight of aircraft at these low altitudes, by noise, and by the
presence of the aircraft and its occupants. These interferences
create in the ordinary mind a sense of infringement of property rights which can not be minimized or effaced. * * * The

combination of all these factors seems to us, under settled principles of law, * * * to constitute trespass to the land of the

plaintiffs so far as concerns the take-offs and landings at low
altitudes and flights made over the land of the plaintiffs' at
altitudes as low as 100 feet."
But the injunction was denied and the bill dismissed because the plaintiff had not shown any damage to his property
or its use. Nor were even nominal damages allowed. The
court says, "Whether the case should have been retained for
assessment of damages, rested in the sound judicial discretion
of the trial judge. That was exercised against the plaintiffs
and presents no error of law. At most upon this record, there
could have been nothing more than nominal damages".
The decree was entered dismissing the bill with costs to
be taxed in favor of the defendants against the plaintiffs.
Those who contend that the mere flight into space above
the surface is a trespass will gain pleasure from the language
of this opinion, but the plaintiff who rested his suit upon that
claim did not gain so much pleasure. He got no injunction
and no damages and had to pay the costs.
The decision in its actual holding, does not go very far
toward protecting the claim of the landowner, that the close
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be not broken, even at altitudes of less than 100 feet, because
the elements upon which the court relied "to constitute trespass" would, according to general rules, constitute nuisance,
the only new principle being the inclusion of the mere "presence of the aircraft and its occupants" as a significant element
of interference with a use of the land which requires privacy
for its enjoyment.
In the Swetland case all flights under 500 feet were enjoined. The language of the court is as follows: "Whether
-property rights or effective possession is interfered with unreasonably is a question of fact in the particular case. * * * In

this instance, in view of the magnitude of the defendants' contemplated operations, in the opinion of the court, the probability is that if defendants were permitted in taking off and
landing to fly at altitudes lower than 500 feet, such flying,
if it would not constitute a trespass, would at least constitute
the maintenance of a nuisance."

This certainly is not a holding that mere flight above the
surface of the ground, even at a height of less than 500 feet
is a trespass. Rather, the relief was granted to prevent a
violation of the third claim of the landowner, that there be
no reasonable interference with a reasonable use of the land.
The landowner has the exclusive right to occupy the
space and need not show actual damage in order to maintain
an action based on an unauthorized occupation of any part of
the space.
These two cases then, leave the law concerning ownership
of space above and below the surface of the ground, just about
where it was.
The landowner can protect his right to enjoy the use of
his land by action for damages or injunction, if he suffers substantial injury and the injury results from an unreasonable
act by the defendant such as a low and noisy and dangerous
flight through the air space.
But the landowner has not yet been allowed to maintain
an action of any sort against the defendant who merely flys
through the plaintiff's space, coming in contact with no tangible thing, possessing no part of the space, and causing no
substantial injury to the landowner in the enjoyment of his
land. And as yet it has not been necessary to resort by way of
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what seems a valid analogy, to the exception based on necessity, as in the early development of agriculture and grazing
in this state.
Nothing has been said about the Uniform State Law for
Aeronautics because it did not apply to the cases discussed and
because it would seem that such legislation could not constitutionally diminish whatever common law property rights already existed. However, the act has been adopted in more
than twenty states, and its provisions should be noted.
SECTION 3. "The ownership of the space above the lands
and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several
owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight
described in section 4."
"SECTION 4. "Flight in aircraft over the land and waters
of this State is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water,
or the space over the land or water, is put by the owner, or
unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons
or property lawfully on the land or water beneath. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of another, without
his consent, is unlawful, except in the case of a forced landing.
For damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner
or lessee of the aircraft or the aeronaut shall be liable".
In effect, this seems to be a statute declaratory of the common law principles of the ownership of space.

"BY LEAVE OF COURT FIRST HAD, * * *"
By Horace N. Hawkins, Jr., of the Denver Bar*
EFORE turning to the cases dealing with this subject let
us examine the statute itself. Its plain purport and
meaning is clear. When there has been a preliminary
examination and the defendant is bound over the district attorney may file the information without leave of court. This
is perfectly proper and does not contravene the constitution
because there has already been testimony under oath and a
judicial determination by the magistrate that probable cause
exists.
However, where no preliminary examination has been
had much more is required by section 8. This is clearly for
the purpose of complying with section 7 of the Bill of Rights,
and the giving of leave by the court is the equivalent of the
magistrate's determination of probable cause. This, while
easily deducible from the statute, is not mere speculation of
the writer, but is the clear and unequivocal holding of the
Colorado decisions.
The case of In re W. S. Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, decided in
1891, was an original application before the Supreme Court
for a writ of habeas corpus. Dolph had been convicted of
embezzlement, a felony, on an information filed in the District Court after he had had a preliminary examination and
had been bound over to the district court. The court dismissed
the writ. The opinion is in part as follows:
"Whether a prosecution for a felony by information is to be regarded as
'due process of law', is by no means a new question. The subject has received
the consideration of the highest judicial tribunals of several of our sister states
and also of the supreme court of the United States. A brief statement of our
views respecting due process of law as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, together with an examination of our own constitution and legislative enactments applicable to the facts of the present controversy, will suffice
for the determination of the first objection above stated.
"No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, says the constitution of the United States; and our own
constitution contains a like declaration. Due process of law within the meaning of these constitutional provisions undoubtedly includes 'law in its regular
*This article is continued from the May number of Dicta.
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course of administration through courts of justice'; it also implies that any individual whose life, liberty or property may be affected by any judicial proceeding shall have timely notice thereof and reasonable opportunity to be heard in
defense of his rights; but it does not necessarily include an indictment by a
grand jury for a felony, even though such prosecution may deprive the accused
of his life or liberty. While ancient forms of procedure are not to be lightly
set aside or disregarded, modem judicial utterances as well as modern constitutions and laws evince more regard for substance than for form. Hurtado v.
The People of Cala., 110 U. S. 516; Rowan v. The State, 30 Wis. 129;
Parrishv. The State, 18 Neb. 405; Miller v. The State, 29 Neb. 437; Cooley
Const. Lim., 5th ed., p. 436.
"It is true that the procuring of an indictment through the intervention
of a grand jury has been considered an important check upon hasty, ill-advised
and malicious criminal prosecutions, and so a corresponding protection to individual rights. But when we consider that the investigation by a grand
jury is wholly ex parte, and in secret,' it may well be doubted whether it affords any better security to the individual than an open accusation followed
by a preliminary examination before a magistrate. In re Losasso, 15 Colo.
170.
"The proceeding known as a 'preliminary examination' under the laws
of this state is well understood. It is a proceeding before a regularly constituted court or judicial magistrate in which the accused has the right to be
present and hear all the witnesses, participate in their examination, and be
heard also in his own behalf. He is also entitled to a change of venue upon
a proper showing without costs. 1 Mills' Ann. Stats., sec. 1484; 2 Id. secs.
2780, 2781.
"The preliminary examination being concluded, the magistrate is required
to find and openly certify his decision as to the probable guilt or innocence
of the accused. If the finding be against the accused, the law requires that
he shall be bound over or committed to appear and answer before the court
having jurisdiction to try and determine the offense; and at the next term of
such court he may be proceeded against for such offense by information in
the same manner as if indicted by a grand jury. Such are the requirements
of our law. Such are the safeguards for the protection of persons accused
of crime by the provisions of the act under consideration. All these requirements having been observed in the petitioner's case, the objection that he has
been deprived of his liberty without due process of law is not, in our judgment, sustained."

In Lustig et al. v. The People, 18 Colo. 217, 32 Pac. 275,
decided in 1893, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
founded upon an unverified information. No preliminary
examination of the defendant had been held. The court held
that the procedure followed violated the seventh section of
the Bill of Rights. The opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Hayt, and is so illuminating that at the risk of unduly pro-
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longing this article it is quoted in its entirety. The Court,
through Justice Hayt, says:
"Authority to institute the prosecution by information is claimed under
section 1 of an act entitled, 'An Act to confer original jurisdiction upon county
courts in misdemeanor cases.'
"'Section 1. Original jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the county
courts in each of the several counties of this state, in cases of misdemeanor,
and such courts shall hereafter be empowered to try such cases upon information by the district attorney of the district in which such counties are situated.'
Session Laws, 1889, p. 101.
"It is claimed that under this provision the information need not necessarily be based upon the oath or affirmation of any person, reduced to writing; that it is sufficient in this respect if signed by the proper prosecuting officer. In support of the position taken by counsel, reference is made to the
common law. It is undoubtedly true that under the ancient common law
the attorney general might inform against any party for a criminal offense,
either upon sufficient evidence, or without any evidence at all.
"But this rule of the common law has been essentially changed in this
respect by the seventh section of our Bill of Rights, which provides that no
warrant 'to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without
describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as
near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
reduced to wrting.' The language of this section is too plain to admit of
misconstruction. An information can serve no practical purpose in the administration of the criminal law, unless a legal warrant can be issued thereon.
And to justify a warrant there must be a charge under oath, reduced to writing. The public prosecutor is no longer authorized to institute a criminal
prosecution against any person by reason of his official signature merely. To
allow him to do so would be contrary to the express provisions of the Bill of
Rights quoted. And the 'probable cause supported by oath or affirmation',
prescribed by this section, is the oath or affirmation of those parties who depose
to the facts, upon which the prosecution is founded. U. S. v. Tureaud, 20
Fed. Rep. 621.
"This is now the settled law in the federal courts, under the fourth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which is substantially the
same as the provisions of our Bill of Rights: U. S. v. Tureaud, supra; U. S.
v. Maxwell, 3 Dillon, 275; U. S. v. Polite, 35 Fed. 58; U. S. v. Smith, 40

Fed. 755.
"Section 6 of the Bill of Rights of Illinois is almost identical with section 7 above quoted. The provisions of the Illinois constitution came before
the supreme court of that state in the case of Myers v. The People, 67 Illinois,
503, and it was there held that an affidavit by the public prosecutor is essential to the validity of an information. In that case the information was based
upon the oath of a private party, while in this case no oath whatever was required. See also State v. Montgomery, 8 Kansas, 351; State v. Nulf, 15
Kansas, 404.
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"The act with reference to informations to be found in the Session Laws
of 1891, commencing at page 240, seems to have been prepared with special
reference to the provisions of our Bill of Rights and the decisions of the courts
based thereon. If carefully followed, errors like the one committed in this
case will in the future be avoided.
"As the information in this case is not supported by the oath or affirmation of any person, the prosecution and conviction thereunder were in violation of the seventh section of our Bill of Rights. The motion to quash should
have been sustained.
"Judgment reversed."

The Supreme Court in 1894, again held prosecution by
information preceded by a preliminary examination and commitment by a Justice of the Peace, not to be unconstitutional.
Nesbit v. The People, 19 Colo. 458.
Brown v. The People, 20 Colo. 161, 36 Pac. 1040, was

decided in 1894, under the law of 1891. The prosecution
therein was commenced by two informations sworn to by the
district attorney upon information and belief. A motion to
quash the capiases was made by the defendant, which the trial
court overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed Brown's conviction on both informations, and held that an information
might be verified upon information and belief by the district
attorney where a preliminary examination had been had; that
the fact of such preliminary examination need not be alleged
in the information; that the defendant must show the want of
such examination; and that inasmuch as defendant introduced
no evidence showing a lack of a preliminary examination, the
motion to quash the capiases was properly denied.
In 1893 the Legislature amended the information Act,
by Ch. 66 of the Session Laws of that year, and the Act as
amended now appears in the Compiled Laws of 1921 at sections 7069 to 7081. This Act changed the form of information to a slight extent, made some regulations to be used as a
guide to the sufficiency thereof, and made two important
changes. Section 1 is as follows:
"SEcTION 1. That section two of an act entitled 'An Act providing for
the prosecution and punishment of crimes, misdemeanors and offenses by information', approved April 14th. 1891, be amended to read as follows, to
wit; Sec. 2. All informations shall be filed in term time, in the court having

jurisdiction of the offenses specified therein, by the district attorney of the
proper county as informant, and his name shall be subscribed thereto by himself or by his deputy. He shall indorse thereon the names of such witnesses
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as are known to him at the time of filing the same, and shall also indorse upon
such information the names of such other witnesses as may become known to
him before the trial at such time as the court may, by rule or otherwise prescribe; but this shall not preclude the calling of witnesses whose names or the
materialty of whose testimony are first learned by the district attorney upon
the trial. In all cases in which the defendant has not had or waived a preliminary examination there shall be filed with the information the affidavit
of some credible person verifying the information upon the personal knowledge of affiant that the offense was committed."

Thus by virtue of section 2 as amended (C. L. 7070) we
find that in no case may the district attorney verify the information on information and belief, and an added requirement
is specified when the accused has had no preliminary examination, to-wit: There shall be filed with the information the
affidavit of some credible person verifying the information
upon the personal knowledge of the affiant that the offense was
committed.
Section 8 of the Act of 1891 as amended by section 3 of
the Act of 1893, provides:
"Sec. 8. An information may be filed against any person for any offense
when such person has had a preliminary examination as provided by law before a justice of the peace or other examining magistrate or officer and has
been bound over to appear at the court having jurisdiction, or shall have
waived his right to such examination; such information shall set forth the
crime committed according to the facts. But if a preliminary examination has
not been had or when upon such examination the accused has been discharged,
or when the affidavit or complaint upon which the examination has been held
has not been delivered to the clerk of the proper court, the district attorney
may, upon affidavit of any person who has knowledge of the commission of
an offense, and who is a competent witness to testify in the case, setting forth
the offense and the name of the person or persons charged with the commission
thereof, upon being furnished with the names of the witnesses for the prosecution, by leave of court first had, file an information, and process shall forthwith issue thereon."

Thus it is clear from the act as amended that the information when there has been no preliminary examination had
or waived, must be accompanied by an affidavit,
(1) of some credible person verifying the information
upon the personal knowledge of the affiant that the offense
was committed, and
(2) the affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the
commission of the offense and who is a competent witness to
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testify in the case, setting forth the offense and the name of
the person or persons charged with the commission thereof;
and leave of court must first be had before the information
can be filed.
The two requirements with reference to affidavits can, of
course, be combined in one affidavit.
In the case of White v. Peo., decided by the Court of
Appeals in 1896, and reported in 18 Appeals, 289, the information, although filed under the Act of 1893, contained a verification by the district attorney on information and belief.
The record did not disclose whether or not a preliminary
examination had been had. The court held the verification
superfluous in the event a preliminary examination was held,
and affirmed the conviction on the presumption of regularity
attendant on judicial proceedings.
In the case of Taylor v. Peo., 1895, 21 Colo., 426, the
court held that the defendant by going to trial without in any
manner attacking the information, waived his right to raise
the question of the absence of a proper affidavit.
In the case of Ratcliffe v. Peo., 1896, 22 Colo. 75, the
supreme court held a prosection by unverified information
following waiver of preliminary examination, the defendant
being bound over to the district court, legal and constitutional.
In 1896, in Walker v. Peo., 22 Colo., 415, 45 Pac. 388,
the supreme court reversed a judgment of conviction because
no leave of court had been obtained for filing the information.
In that case no preliminary examination had been had or
waived. The opinion is in part as follows:
"We have deemed it necessary in this case to pass upon these objections in
view of a new trial, although the judgment of the county court must be reversed because the information was filed without leave of court. It is urged
by the attorney general that the provisions of the statute restricting the filing
of informations by the prosecuting officer, in cases where no preliminary examination has been had, to cases in which an affidavit has been filed of a person having knowledge of the commission of the offense, is ample to prevent
abuse of his powers. It is a sufficient answer to this argument to say that the
legislature did not so regard it. To protect the rights of the citizen and
guard him against oppression and malice, the legislature has made it necessary
that a judicial order shall be obtained before a charge can be preferred, and
the courts have no right to construe away or defeat this statutory provision.
"In the case of State v. Brett (Mont.) 40 Pac. Rep. 873, it is said:
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"'It is suggested that obtaining of a leave of the court is a mere perfunctory matter, and is granted of course. This argument, if true, reflects credit
upon the several county attorneys of the state for having administered their
offices with that high sense of impartial responsibility and power imposed upon
them by the constitution, but it loses its entire force if an instance should arise
where a prosecuting officer oppressively, maliciously, or otherwise illegally
should attempt to unjustly harass any citizen by filing an information charging him with crime.'
"The information in this case having been filed without leave of court,
the judgment of the county court must be reversed."

From the quoted portion of the opinion it will be seen
that the conviction was reversed because leave of court was
not obtained to file the information. If, as is undoubtedly
the law by virtue of this decision, leave of court to file the information is so important that no conviction can be had without it where there is no preliminary examination or waiver
thereof, the granting or refusing of such leave must be a very
important judicial function indeed.
NOTE:

This article will be concluded in the next number of Dicta.

BOOKS LOST
The Denver Bar Association Library reports that two books are missing: 30 U. S.
and 76 N. W. If the lawyers will kindly
glance over their stray volumes, perhaps the
lost can be rescued!

DICTAPHUN
PIGS ARE PIGS
In Kolkman v. People, No. 12651, a case involving a theft of hogs, decided by the Supreme Court on May 11, 1931, the majority opinion, written
by Mr. Justice Alter occupies 26 sheets of foolscap. The concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Burke occupies 5 such sheets, the concurring opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Adams takes 2, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Butler
takes 23, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Hilliard takes 23.
In the course of his opinion Mr. Chief Justice Adams remarks: "No
one can fail to be entertained by Mr. Justice Hilliard's dissertation on the
subject of French kings, but what about Charley's hogs?"
Yes, and what about practicing lawyers that have to pay $3.50 a volume
for the Colorado reports?

PHILLIPS COUNTY-THE LAND OF
OPPORTUNITY
Wouldst be a proud father or doting mother without the expense and
care of children? Wouldst? Then list to the words of Mr. Justice Hilliard
in Duncan v. People, No. 12808, decided May 25, 1931.
Says Hilliard, J.: "The plaintiffs in error constitute the board of directors of school district No. 11, Phillips County, and hereinafter will be referred to as the board. The defendants in error are resident property owners,
taxpayers and parents of children of school age, hereinafter called the parents."

DISSENT A LA TEXAS
From Battles v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 176: "After reviewing the opinion
of my brethren I have reached the conclusion it is unnecessary to do more
than to enter my dissent without extended comment. I am persuaded that
a casual reading of the opinion will be sufficient to demonstrate its legal unsoundness, as well as to discover the incongruities and fallacies to be found
in it."

CRIMINAL LAW SECTION
"The exception itself deprives an accused party of a most inestimable
privilege secured to him by the 9th section of article 13 of our constitution,
'to meet the witness face to face', so that, by cross-examination, the truth may
be eliminated." Marshall v. Chicago R. Co., 48 Ill. 477.
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HOW ABOUT SPLIT INFINITIVES?
"The court is presumed to know the letters of the alphabet when they
are plainly written." First National Bank v. Hacoda, (Ala.) 53 So. 802.

IT DEPENDS WHICH SIDE YOU ARE ON
"Now, the quality of justice or injustice in a given transaction does not
depend upon or vary with the name or character of the court under whose
jurisdiction it is brought for consideration." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Bouvier, 79 N. J. Eq. 174.

FRENCH KINGS?
"Mulattoes, negroes, malays, whites, millionaires, paupers, princes, and
kings, in the courts of Mississippi, are on precisely the same exactly equal
footing." Hampton v. State, 88 Miss. 257.

ANSWER YES OR NOI
"Whether such an instrument is a deed or a will can only be decided in
the affirmative." Isler v. Griflin, (Ga.) 67 S. E. 855.

YEAH
If we told you where we steal the stuff we print here every month you
could get on the pay roll too.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrroa's No'r.m-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

VENDOR

AND

PURCHASER -

ESTATE

FORECLOSURE-INJUNCTIoN-Toll

SALES -

MERCHANTABLE

TITLE-

v. McKenzie et al.-Nos. 12391 and

12392-Decided April 27, 1931.
Facts.-Two cases were consolidated in the supreme court, one from the
district court on injunction, one from the county court in probate.
Title was in Owens, who in 1919 conveyed by warranty deed to McKenzie, who borrowed most of the purchase price from Casey, a close friend,
and gave a trust deed to secure the loan. The warranty deed was not recorded, but the trust deed was. McKenzie died in 1922, leaving a will executed in 1918 in favor of his widow, which was abated (C.L. 5189) as to
two children born in 1920 and 1921. Casey examining deceased's papers
found the unrecorded deed. He procured a new warranty deed from Owens
to Mrs. McKenzie (dated back to 1919) which he then (1922) recorded.
He destroyed the unrecorded deed to McKenzie, released his trust deed and
took a new one from Mrs. McKenzie for the $5,000 balance of the debt.
Thereafter Mrs. McKenzie as apparent owner sold to Toll by warranty deed,
who paid the purchase price except for the amount of the new Casey trust
deed. Toll paid interest and $1000 on principal to Casey, who then disclosed
to Toll the former ownership of McKenzie. Thereupon it was agreed by
contract signed by Casey and Mrs. McKenzie with Toll to probate the McKenzie will, institute guardianship, give the court all the facts, and if the
court approved sell the minors' interest to Toll, Mrs. McKenzie and Casey
to furnish Toll funds to purchase, and to pay all the costs of the proceedings
including fees of Toll's attorney.
The estates were opened, but the facts were not disclosed to the court.
Mrs. McKenzie was appointed executrix and guardian. She obtained an
order for the sale of the premises, and reported that she had sold it to Toll
subject to an encumbrance (her trust deed to Casey) assumed by the purchaser,
and had received the purchase price above the encumbrance. As guardian
she receipted to herself as executrix for the minors' share on distribution. No
cash actually passed.
Toll rejected the executrix' deed, and refused to pay Casey unless further steps were taken. Casey began foreclosure. Toll brought the district
court action to stop him, alleging that Mrs. McKenzie and Casey had entered
into a scheme to defraud the minors and palm off a'bad title on Toll. The
day before the trial Toll filed in the county court probate (closed 19 months)
a disclaimer, alleging there had been no sale, he had not bought, no money
had been paid, the court had not been given the facts (which he then gave),
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Mrs. McKenzie had an interest hence was prohibited (C.L. 5317) from
making the sale; and petitioned that the proceedings be vacated.
Defendants had judgment in the district court. Later the county court
sustained a demurrer to Toll's proceedings there. Toll brought error from
both judgments.
Held.-1. There was an intent to deceive, but ro intent to injure the
minors; hence the fraud was in that sense constructive only.
2. While the letter of the contract was violated, its spirit was not. It
makes no difference now who gave the facts to the probate court. When they
were given it still had discretion to affirm the sale.
3. By sustaining the demurrer the county court affirmed the sale.
4. That no actual cash was paid is immaterial. Making useless motions
would have added nothing to the transaction. The sale on paper was in all
respects valid. Mrs. McKenzie had already received in her personal capacity
the money belonging to the minors, and when she charged herself with it in a
proceeding in which she was bonded to account the result was the same.
5. Her "interest" was in fact against the sale, because the sale resulted
in charging her for money which she had received in her personal capacity.
6. Toll's contract, plus the proceedings, makes him a purchaser.
7. Toll's litigation is not without reason. He was justified in believing
that the title had turned out not to be good. The variations from the contract
in the county court proceedings again cast a doubt on his title. But when this
transaction is closed as hereinafter directed he will have good title.
8. A mortgagee who has participated in a fraud on a purchaser cannot
assert estoppel against the purchaser.
9. The contract clearly implied that Casey should not foreclose until
he had complied with his contract. He has not yet fully done so. He can
get no relief by foreclosure or otherwise until the wrong he perpetrated is
undone and those damaged are made whole.
Ordered.-That on or before June 1, 1931, Toll pay to Casey the balance due to Casey on the encumbrance with interest at 6% per annum, less
the obligations assumed by Casey under the terms of his contract; that thereupon Casey release his trust deed to Toll. Each party bears his own costs in
each court.
Judgment modified and affirmed.
On application for rehearing.-May 11, 1931.

The district court case

remanded to effectuate the opinion.

TRUSTS-STRANGERS

TO

TRUST-COLLATERAL

ATTACK-Underhill and

Marsh v. Whitney, Trustee-No. 12511-Decided May 4, 1931.

Facts-Whitney, as Trustee, had judgment in Court below against
Underhill and Marsh for damages for breach of contract to purchase cattle.
The Cross S. Cattle Company, an Arizona corporation, executed and delivered
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a trust deed for $350,000.00 to one Henry Carstens, Trustee, on real estate
and livestock in Arizona. This trust deed contained the usual provisions
authorizing the appointment of a successor in trust. Subsequently L. L.
Hillman was appointed successor inr trust and later Hillman was succeeded
by Haskell, as successor in trust. While Haskell was trustee he foreclosed
the mortgage and as such trustee, and with the consent of 93 per cent of the
bondholders purchased the real estate and livestock at the foreclosure sale and
thereafter, as such trustee, sold certain cattle to Underhill and Marsh, delivered a part, and received part payment, and thereafter, Whitney was appointed
successor in trust and brought this action against the defendants for the balance of the purchase price. At the trial below, defendants demurred to the
plaintiff's evidence on the ground of want of capacity of the plaintiff to sue
as trustee and moved for a non-suit, both of which were overruled and defendants electing to stand thereon, judgment was entered against the defendants.
Held-1. Plaintiff had capacity to sue as trustee.
2. The authority of his predecessor in trust, Haskell, did not terminate
upon the foreclosure sale.
3. Haskell's purchase at the foreclosure sale was authorized by 93 per
cent of the bondholders and he obtained title as trustee and not in his individual capacity.
4. The power to appoint a successor in trust after the foreclosure was
not terminated by the foreclosure, as the power of trustee continued for the
purpose of distributing the proceeds of sale to the bondholders, and the power
to appoint a successor authorized by the trust deed also continued for such
purposes.
5. The foreclosure decree specifically authorized any party to the action
to become a purchaser at the sale, and no bondholders ever questioned the
validity of the sale or Haskell's good faith, or his right to purchase as trustee,
or to conduct the business as a going concern.
6. No bondholder has attacked Haskell's power to resign as trustee or
to assign to Whitney, or Whitney's authority to act as their trustee, or to
prosecute this action, for their benefit.
7. The defendants below are strangers to the trust and cannot collaterally attack the trust.
Judgment affirmed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-ADMINISTRATORS-FORECLOSURE WITHOUT LEAVE
OF COURT-CONVERSION-McCormick, Administrator, vs. The First National Bank of Mead, Colorado-No. 12424-Decided May 4, 1931.
Facts-This was an action by plaintiff, McCormick, as Administrator of
the estate of William J. Howlett, against the First National Bank of Mead
for conversion, to recover a money judgment for damages. Howlett, during
his lifetime, borrowed money from the Bank and secured the loan by chattel
mortgage on his livestock and farming implements. The note fell due three
days before his death, and after his death and before probate proceedings were
commenced, the bank elected to foreclose, took possession of the chattels, and
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at a public sale, sold the mortgaged chattels. Probate proceedings were not
instituted until more than a year after Howlett's death.
Judgment below for defendant.
Held.-I. The action was for conversion of chattel property.
2. Trover cannot be maintained by one who has neither title nor right
of possession.
3. Trover was the common law remedy for the conversion of chattel
property.
4. The bank had title to the property and upon default had rightful
possession also.
5. Section 5344 C. L. 1921, which provides that no mortgage upon any
property, real or personal, owned by any person at the date of his death shall
be foreclosed except by permission of the County Court does not apply to this
case beciuse letters of administration did not issue within one year from the
death of Howlett.
Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-HAIL--CHANGE OF VENUE-WAIVER-Great American Insurance Company v. Scott-No. 12561-DecidedMay 4, 1931.
Facts.-Scott sued to recover damages to his wheat crop occasioned by
hail and had a judgment below for $2,139.38. The wheat crop was located
in Yuma County, Colorado, and the action was brought in the District Court
of the City and County of Denver. The defendant sought a change of venue
to Yuma County, charging that the real property involved was situate there
and the insurance was payable there. The defendant suffered loss from two
storms. He made no claim for damages from first storm, but did make claim
for damages from second hail storm, and appraisers were appointed, made
finding, but the Insurance Company refused to pay for the loss occasioned by
the second hail storm unless the plaintiff signed a release of defendant's liability caused by the first. The defendant insisted that the complaint was
defective because it did not charge that the plaintiff duly performed all of the
conditions of insurance contract.
Judgment below for plaintiff.
Held.-1. The Court below properly denied the motion for change of
venue. The suit was for breach of contract and not for damages to real
property. The fact that the crops were growing in Yuma County is immaterial. The defendant being a non-resident of Colorado, the proper county
in which to institute the action was that "designated in the complaint".
2. The allegations of the complaint substantially comply with Section
72 of the Code, relative to performance of the contract; and even if it did
not, the allegations in the complaint of adjusted losses and repudiation thereof
by the insurance company was a sufficient allegation of waiver of such performance.
3. Waiver may be proven under a general allegation of performance.
4. Even though the policy contains a clause prohibiting waiver, the law
does not permit an insurance company to avoid liability on account of non-
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performance of conditions required by the policy to be performed by the insured where the conduct of the insurance company's agents caused such failure.
Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REOPENING CASE-MODIFICATION WITHOUT NOTICE-Mantor v. Industrial Commission, et al.-No. 12788-De-

cided May 11, 1931.
Facts.-The Industrial commission denied Mantor's petition to reopen
a compensation award. The District Court upheld the action of the Commission and Mantor seeks a reversal of the judgment.
Held.-I. Section 4471 of the Compiled Laws, 1921, permits any person
dissatisfied with the finding and award of the Referee to petition the Commission for review, and provides that unless such petition is filed within ten
days after the finding and award, or within the period of any extension that
may have been granted, the finding and award shall be considered as the final
finding and award of the commission. Mantor failed to avail himself of the
provisions of this section.
2. Section 4484 of the Compiled Laws, 1921, gives the commission
power, upon its motion, to review any award. This section permits, but does
not require, the commission to review any award or make a new award. Action under this section is discretionary and the action of the commission cannot be set aside by a court, except in case of fraud or a clear abuse of discretion.
3. The Referee should not have corrected the award without a full
hearing and upon notice to the parties, but in this case, in view of the fact
that subsequently there were two full hearings upon notice and Mantor and
his attorney participated therein without objections and Mantor has accepted full payment of the award he cannot now question the award.
Judgment affirmed.
ATTACHMENT-CLAIM OF THIRD PARTY-NECESSITY OF ISSUING CITATION

-Burnett v. Jeffers-No. 12357-Decided May 11, 1931.
Facts.-Jeffers sued Updegraff and his wife for $300.00. A Writ of
Attachment and a Summons in Garnishment were served upon Chase, as garnishee. Chase answered, stating that he was holding 110 bags of onions
brought to his warehouse by Updegraff and that Burnett claimed to own the
onions by virtue of an assignment by Updegraff to him. No citation of summons was served upon Burnett. Burnett filed his petition in intervention
alleging ownership, which was later stricken, and his application to further
plead denied, and judgment entered for Jeffers.
Held.-I. Where garnishee defendant in his answer states that a third
party claims ownership, it is the duty of the Court to issue a citation or summons requiring such third party to appear and set up his claim.
2. Where, before the garnishment proceedings are determined, a third
party files his verified petition in intervention, he is entitled to have his claim
tried and determined.
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3. In denying him that right, the Court below committed reversible
error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

QUIET TITLE-TRUsT-HUSBAND AND WIFE-TRANSFER OF PROPERTY-

Hines v. Baker, et al.-No. 12384-Decided May 11, 1931.
Facts.-Hinesreceived a sheriff's deed to real property in Denver. He
thereupon sued Isabelle Baker, C. H. Baker, and Frances Bacon, to procure
the cancellation, as fraudulent, of certain deeds to the property, namely, a
deed from the wife to the husband, and a deed from the husband to the wife
under her maiden name. Baker filed a counter claim to quiet title in himself.
The court below rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and quieting title in C. H. Baker.
Held.-1. The transaction whereby the property purchased with the
money of Baker was conveyed to his wife is presumed to have been a gift or
an advancement.
2. Baker claiming that no gift or advancement was intended and that
as the property was purchased with his money, the resulting trust arose in his
favor and such claim being supported by the evidence, the judgment for Baker
should be affirmed.
3. The claim that there was a resulting trust, to prevail, must be established by evidence that is strong and convincing.
4. The trial court is the judge, not only of the credibility of witnesses
and of the weight of the evidence but also of the inferences properly deducible
from the facts and circumstances proven at the trial.
Judgment affirmed.
PROHIBITION-JURISDICTION-STATE OFFICERs-The People v. the District
Court of the Second Judicial District, et al.-No. 12657-Decided May

11, 1931.
Facts.-The exercise of the original constitutional jurisdiction of this
court is sought by the People upon the relation of three members of the Colorado State Board of Corrections, the Warden of the State Penitentiary, the
Special Deputy Warden, and the Chief of the State Law Enforcement Department in their petition for a writ of prohibition against the District Court
and the judge thereof. The petitioners seek to restrain the District Court
and the Judge from exercising jurisdiction in contempt proceeding to punish
the petitioners for permitting certain freedom to an inmate of the State Peni-

tentiary who had theretofore been sentenced to the Penitentiary and whose
sentence had not expired.
Held.-1. A cause is pending until it reaches a final determination, either
in the court of original jurisdiction or in the appellate court.
2. Sentence was pronounced in a criminal action in 1927 and no writ
of error was sued out to review the final judgment of the District Court, and
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the District Court was without jurisdiction of the cause at the time the contempt proceedings were filed.
3. But even if the Court had jurisdiction, penitentiary officials of Colorado, being state officers and not officers of the Court, are not guilty of the
contempt charged against them in the District Court, and are only liable for
their wrongful acts, if any they committed, to prosecution for a violation of
official duty.
Writ of Prohibition granted.
TRIAL-TRIAL COURT COMMENTING ON EviDENcE-Kolkman v. the People-No. 12651-Decided May 11, 1931.
Facts.-John Kolkman, Roy Kolkman, J. B. Morrison, and William
Morrison, fathers and sons respectively, were jointly charged with the crime
of grand larceny. The Court granted the Morrisons a separate trial. Upon
the trial of the Kolkmans, John was convicted and sentenced, but the jury
failed to agree as to Roy. John Kolkman prosecutes error seeking reversal:
( I ) because of refusal of the trial court to grant his motion for separate trial;
(2) the trial court's comments on the evidence made to the jury.
Held.-l. A. Unless the bill of exceptions discloses the admission of
prejudicial evidence, no error is committed in denying a motion for a severance.
B. The motion for a severance, or the affidavit in support must set forth
the incompetent and prejudicial evidence so as to advise the trial court in determining the question of granting or denying the motion.
C. Query: Can the defendant avoid the two rules above announced
by alleging that he can not advise the court more definitely as to what the
testimony to be offered by the People would be which would be competent
against one and not against the other?
D. While the defendant cannot be required to do impossible things, yet
the evidence in this case clearly shows a conspiracy to commit the crime of
grand larceny and although conspiracy was not charged, yet the acts and
declarations of one conspirator in furtherance of the common design were
admissible against both defendants; and as such evidence would have been
admissible had the defendant been tried separately, there was no prejudicial
error in denying the motion for a separate trial.
2. Rule 14B, adopted by the Supreme Court, July 1, 1929, provides
that the rules governing comments by district judges on evidence shall be those
now in force in the United States District Court. Under this rule, the District Court may comment to the jury upon the evidence and express his opinion as to the facts in the case, so long as he leaves to the jury the ultimate
decision as to what the facts are.
Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEPARATE

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION -

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS -

BENE-

Firs--Santa Fe Land Improvement Company v. The City and County of
Denver--No. 12286-Decided May 11, 1931.
Facts.-The Santa Fe Land Improvement Company, together with 46
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other landowners of property in a sanitary sewer district brought an action
in the district court against the City and County of Denver, and certain of
its officers to have special assessments declared invalid and to enjoin and restrain the collection thereof, and to quiet title as against the same. A general
demurrer to the complaint was sustained and plaintiffs elected to stand on
their complaint and the action was dismissed.
Held.-l. The complaint stated a cause of action.
2. The allegations of the complaint, the truth thereof being admitted
by the demurrer are that plaintiff's property is not benefited in the slightest
degree by the construction of the sewer in said district, for the cost of constructing which, if the assessments are valid, plaintiffs' property is being taken
under the guise of special assessment.
3. Section 60, Article 3, of the Charter of the City and County of Denver, provides that the cost of constructing sewers and laterals in all regularly
organized sewer districts shall be apportioned as the area of each lot or piece
of land in the district is to the area of all the real estate therein.
4. This does not mean that the taxing authorities can levy assessments
irrespective of the benefits or that this method of assessment according to area
is a legislative determination that the benefits exceed the assessment, and that
this determination is conclusive upon all.
5. The City Council sitting as a board of equalization is not bound by
this provision to make its determination irrespective of benefits.
6. Special assessments for local improvements are authorized and permitted upon the theory that the local improvement generally and peculiarly
enhances the value of the property against which the assessment is levied to
an amount equal to, if not in excess of, the amount of the special assessment.
7. Irrespective of the method of apportionment all special assessments
are fundamentally and basically founded upon special benefits, without which
they cannot stand.
8. When it is properly determined that a special benefit will result from
a local improvement, any method of apportionment is valid so long as the
amount thereof does not exceed the value of that special benefit.
9. The plaintiffs wrongfully were denied a hearing because the board
of equalization believed itself bound by the charter provision requiring the
cost to be apportioned according as the area of each tract bore to the entire
area of the district; and that the board lacked the power or authority to
deviate therefrom and consequently the question of benefits was immaterial.
This was an erroneous assumption and a wholly incorrect conclusion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

DICTA

REGISTERED ATTORNEY U. S. AND CANADIAN PATENT OFFICES

R. H. GALBREATH
PATENT ATI'ORNEY
U. S. and FOREIGN PATENTS, TRADEMARKS and COPYRIGHTS
TELEPHONE TABOR 0425
DENVER

Denver Theatre Buildind

154 Glenarm Street

The J(CKMONTinc.
FOR THE FINEST IN

FLOWERS and DECORATIONS
WITH SERVICE OF DISTINCTION AND DEPENDABILITY
823 - 17th Street

Denver National Building

"

ALL MAKES
AND PRICES
RIBBONS

*

S'
iI

Imd

TAbor 5521

TA lIGUARANTEED
EVERY ONE

f

SUPPLIES

SOLD - RENTED - REPAIRED
926 - 17th Street

DENVER

MAin 1024

DICTA

Compliments of

Brown Palace Hotel
THE

W. H.
1550

COURTRIGHT PUBLISHING Co.

GLENALM PLACE

-

MAIN

6448

-

DENVER

LAW BOOKS
COMPLETE STOCK NEW AND SECOND-HAND BOOKS
AND LIBRARIES FOR COLORADO LAWYERS

SAVE MONEY

FOR ALL

On Notices, Reports, Form Letters

LEGAL fDVERTISING

Have them

MUTUAL MULTIGRAPHING CO.

I

Io

The Daily Journal
EFFICIENT SERVICE

302 KITTREDGE BUILDING
KEystone 4969

710-15 KITTREDGE BLDG., DENVER
TAbor 6725
Quick Service-Moderate Prices

JEWELS OF

HERBERT FAIRALL Au JAMES . GAULE.

PUBLISHERS

INDIVIDUALITY

JOS. I. SCHWARTZ
Maker and Retailer of Quality j'ewelry for Over Forty Years
633 SIXTEENTH

STREET

